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MORATORIUM DECREES AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A bill of exchange was drawn and accepted in Paris, payable
in New York. Both drawer and acceptor were citizens of France.
In an action brought against the acceptor in New York, it was
held that the latter might set up in defense a moratorium decree
of the French government extending the time of payment of
commercial paper.'
The report of the case leaves us in doubt whether the decree
in question was an executive order issued pursuant to a law
existing at the inception of the contract, or a retrospective act
of legislation. We are therefore uncertain which of the two
following problems in the conflict of laws is involved: first,
whether the rule governing the creation of a contractual obliga-
tion (be it lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis) or the rule
' Taylor v. Kouchakji (1916) 56 N. Y. L. J. 813.
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of the place of performance, as such,2 should be applicable to
determine the effect of subsequent facts in modification of such
contractual obligation; second, whether the rule usually applic-
able (be it the one or the other as above specified) should be
adopted (or "incorporated") by the law of the forum as the
applicable rule, even though the incorporated rule be a retro-
active law in the country of its origin. A brief discussion of
each of these two problems may not be without interest.
First: rule usually applicable: The action having been brought
in New York, and the court of that state having acquired juris-
diction over the parties, the initial inquiry is: how does the
forum ever come to confront the question as to the possible
application of a foreign rule to the subject-matter before it?
Why should it in any case apply any other substantive law than
its own local rule?
Correctly understood, the entire process of adoption and appli-
cation of foreign rules by the lex fori (in the widest sense)-i. e.,
what may be called "incorporation by reference"--is to be
regulated purely according to considerations of justice, policy,
expediency, and international reciprocity, as formulated in the
domestic rules as to the conflict of laws.3 If the domestic law-
In favor of the latter contention, that is, that the lex loci solutionis
as such should control even though the creation of the particular primary
obligation involved is to be determined according to the lex loci con-
tractus, are New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Maldonado & Co.
(1915) 225 Fed. 353, Rogers, Circuit Judge, dissenting; Professor Beale
(i896) io HARv. L. Rav. I68, 173, and Cases on Conflict of Laws, Vol. III,
Summary, secs. 54, 96, 97.
8 See, to this effect, Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld (19o) 9 COL. L. R-v.
496, 520, _q=, note 16, where the logical and jural bases of the conflict of
laws are set forth.
This view of free adoption and incorporation by reference is, of course,
radically opposed, both as regards logical analysis and as regards prac-
tical results, to any theory which assumes that, according to some
a priori principle or supposed necessity due to the intrinsic nature of law,
the application of foreign rules is limited in some way to the "recognition"
and "enforcement" of "foreign-created rights"--the "power" of the
foreign law to "create" rights being in turn limited by some supposed
principle of "territoriality."
Compare Professor Beale, Summary, supra, sec. I: "The topic called
'Conflict of Laws' deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign-
created rights." Also sec. go: "If on the other hand the law of the place
where the agreement is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no
other law which has power to do so."
Compare also Professor Beale (igio) 23 H~av. L. Rxv. 267: "If the law
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making power, in formulating such rules, feel the pressure of
any external constraint at all, the latter can consist only of those
very generic principles of "international law" which forbid a
fundamental denial of justice to aliens.4 The purpose of a sys-
tem of rules of conflict of laws being to minimize the practical
inconvenience of the operation of more than one system of
substantive law upon a single transaction, manifestly such pur-
pose would best be served by a determination with reference to
a single body of law of both questions, first, the creation of the
contractual obligation, and, second, the nature of the con-
tractual obligation, including of necessity the liability to subse-
quent modification by the operation of supervening facts.5
From this viewpoint, therefore, the French local rule, being
regarded by the New York court as applicable to determine the
creation of the acceptor's obligation, was properly held similarly
applicable to determine the effect of the moratorium decree in
postponing the maturity of his obligation.
This conclusion would seem to be supported by three lines of
leading decisions. If, instead of a moratorium decree "modify-
ing" the primary obligation as regards time of payment (i. e.,
of the place where the parties act refuses legal validity to their acts, it is
impossible to see on what principle some other law may nevertheless give
their acts validity. The law of the place of performance can have
no effect as law in another place, namely, the place where the parties
act. . . . Any attempt to make the law of the place of performance
govern the act of contracting is an attempt to give to that law extrater-
ritorial effect."
Ibid., 268: "In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined
theoretically by the law governing the transaction, i. e., the law of the
place where the parties act in making their agreement. If by that law
their acts have no legal efficacy, then no other state can give them greater
effect."
Ibid., 27I: "This doctrine gives full scope to the territoriality of law,
and enables each sovereign to regulate acts of agreement done in his own
territory."
"See, as regards fundamental denial of justice to aliens, Professor
Edwin M. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915)
PP. 13, 178, 196-199, 330 ff.
'For a discussion of the various considerations of expediency with
reference to the similar question of the law governing the secondary
rights and duties resulting from a breach of contract, see (1915) 25 YALE
LAW JoURNAL, 147, criticising the majority opinion in New York & Cuba
Mail S. S. Co. v. Maldonado & Co. (igir) 225 Fed. 353, and the doctrine
thereof that the secondary relations should be regulated by the lex loci
solutionis, as such. See note 2, supra.
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really extinguishing the original obligation and substituting a
new one), we have an attempted assignment by the obligee to a
third person, the effect of this attempted assignment in imposing
upon the obligor a substituted obligation to the assignee is, by
the weight of authority, determined by the same rule as governs
the creation of the contract.6 The power to assign really involves
the extinguishment of the original obligation and the creation
of a new and more or less corresponding obligation in favor of
a new obligee.7 In the case of assignment, in other words, the
modification relates to persons. In the case of a moratorium
decree made by governmental officers empowered by previously
existing law, the modification relates to time of performance.
Affording similar support to the views here expressed are cases
involving the validity of an attempted discharge by agreement
* or other act of the parties. Such validity depends, ilot upon the
law of the place of the attempted discharge, nor upon that of the
place of performance as such, but upon the law of the contract."
A like result has been reached where the question was the
effect of certain supervening non-legal facts, independent of the
acts of the parties. Such, for example, are cases of impossibility
of performance arising from physical causes.9
We conclude, therefore, that the law of the contract was prop-
erly held to determine the effect of the moratorium decree in
the principal case.10
'See Zipcey v. Thompson (1854) i Gray (Mass.) 243; Jackson v.
Tiernan (i84o) i5 La. 485; Lebel v. Tucker (1867) L. P. 3 Q. B. 77;
compare contra, Lee v. Abdy (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309; Professor Beale,
op. cit., Summary, sec. 68.
" See, for a complete analysis and discussion of the power to assign,
comment in (917) 26 YAx.x LAw JOURNAL, 302-308.
"Lindsay v. Collings (1916) 182 S. W. (Tex.) 879; Tenant v. Tenat
(1885) 11O Pa. St. 478; Gibbs v. Soci&t6 IndustrieUe (i8go) 25 Q. B. D.
399; see contra, Professor Beale, op. cit., Summary, sec. 96.
'Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 589; see contra, Beale,
Summary, sec. 97.
"
0The following authorities clearly holding or intimating that the law
of the contract as such governs the entire contractual relation, are in
point: Gray v. Western Union Tel. Co. (igoi) i08 Term. 39; Gray v.
State (i88o) 72 Ind. 567, 581; Coghlan v. S. C. Ry. Co. (i89i) 142 U. S.
io; Thurman v. Kyle (1883) 7z Ga. 628; Amsinck v. Rogers (19o7)
189 N. Y. 252; In re Commercial Bank (1887) 36 Ch. D. 522; Allen v.
Kemble (1848) 6 Moore P. C. 314.
More explicitly to the same effect are the following:
"Whatever goes to the substance of the obligation and affects the
rights of the parties, as growing out of the contract itself, or inhering
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Second: applicability of same law even though retroactive:
This second question is more difficult. Would the result be
affected if the moratorium decree were a piece of retroactive
legislation? This question obviously can arise only where, by
the law of the contract, such retroactive legislation is constitu-
tionally possible. According to the general principles of conflict
of laws, there could be no distinction between the case of a pre-
existing statute creating an antecedent liability to a subsequent
modification of a contractual obligation by executive decree,
and the case of a constitution creating a similar liability to a
subsequent modification by retroactive legislation. In either case
this liability would inhere in the contract in its inception, as a
part of the law of the contract at that time. Is an exception,
based on the public policy of the forum, to be recognized as
regards retrospective legislation? Such exception can arise only
in case the domestic constitutional objections to retroactive legis-
lation find some correspondence in a rule of conflict of laws
requiring the exclusion of similar foreign legislation from the
usual recognition.
Manifestly none of the usual reasons for refusing such recog-
nition exist in this case. The resultant legal relation is, after
modification no less than before, in all respects consistent with
the public policy of the forum. Nor is the fact of modification
in it, or attaching to it, is.governed by the law of the contract." Pritchard
v. Norton (1882) io6 U. S. x4, i29.
"It is a general rule that in all that relates to the nature, validity and
interpretation of a contract, the lex loci contractus governs; . . .. So
the lex loci contractus governs in all matters affecting the substantive
rights of the parties." Atwood v. Walker (i9ox) 179 Mass. 514, 518-g,
containing strong dictum that the secondary right to damages should be
determined according to the lex loci contractus rather than the lex loci
solutionis.
"The general rule as to the law which governs a contract is that the
law of the country either where the contract was made, or where it is
to be so performed that it must be considered to be a contract of that
country, is the law which governs such a contract, not merely with regard
to its construction, but with regard to all the conditions applicable to it
as a contract. I say 'applicable to it as a contract' to exclude mere
matters of procedure which do not affect the contract as such, but relate
merely to the procedure of the court in which litigation may take place
upon the contract" Gibbs v. SociitM Industrielle (i89o) 25 Q. B. D. 399,
409.
See, in accord with the doctrine of the above cases, Professor Wesley
N. Hohfeld (igog) 9 Cor. L Rim. 497, note 3a.
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itself repugnant to that policy. In this respect the result is not
unlike that of a contract expressly conditioning a modification of
its terms upon a subsequent fact beyond the control of the parties.
To proceed, in such a case, merely upon a disapproval of a for-
eign constitutional policy, irrespective of the unobjectionable
nature of the resultant situation, would be to give weight to a mat-
ter with which the forum could have but little concern, much as
if it were to refuse to recognise a title to property acquired in a
foreign state, because of the objectionable character of the law
under which that title was acquired. In neither case would the
law of the forum be acting with a view to preserving vested
rights, but merely creating rights of its own unlike those vested
under the law of the place.
Such authority as exists supports this view. In Phillips v.
Eyre,"' an obligation ex delicto created by the law of Jamaica
was sued upon in England. A retrospective act of indemnity
and discharge in the colony was successfully pleaded as a valid
defense. The court, applying its reasoning to contracts as well
as to torts, said:
"As to foreign laws affecting the liability of parties in
respect of bygone transactions, the law is clear that ....
if the foreign law extinguishes the right, it is a bar in this
country equally as if the extinguishment had been by a
release of the party, or an act of our own legislature."
While this authority is not quite conclusive, owing to the fact
that no constitutional inhibition against retroactive legislation
existed in the English forum, yet the language of the opinions ren-
dered by the English court clearly reveals the substantial similarity
of the public policy of the forum to that of jurisdictions where
constitutional limitations against such legislation exist.
More directly in point is the case of Rouquette v. Overmn,12
in which a retroactive moratory law of France was applied by an
English court in a suit upon a bill accepted and payable in
France.
Upon either view of the facts, therefore, our conclusions are in
accord with the decision of the principal case.""
C. R. W.
zi87o) L. RL 6 Q. B. I; s. c. (1868) L. R- 4 Q. B. 24
S(1875) L. Rt 1o Q. B. 525.
"For a general discussion of moratory decrees and the conflict of laws,
from a comparative standpoint, see Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen, Con-flict of Laws as to Bills and Notes-A Study in Comparative Law,
Part V. (917) x MINN. L. R1V. 401, 412 ff.
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THE PROPER INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AS TO DUTY OF GOING
FORWARD AND AS TO THE PROBATIVE FORCE OF FACTS
GIVING RISE TO A PRESUMPTION
Wheeler's Appeal' is of interest because of the side light which
it sheds on Kirby's Appeal
2
In the latter case the court says:
"The instruction that the plaintiffs were bound to prove
not only that a relation of special confidence existed
between the testatrix and the proponent of the will, but
that the latter took part in procuring the will, before the
prima facie presumption of undue influence arose and
the burden of proof shifted, was erroneous."3
This was said although there was other evidence bearing upon
undue influence than the existence of the relation of trust and
confidence.
In Wheeler's Appeal it is held that there was no error in
refusing to charge that from the fact of due execution there is
a presumption of sanity, the court saying:
"The presumption of sanity would be sufficient until
evidence tending to show the contrary was introduced
by the contestants. The proponents would after the intro-
duction of such evidence be required to rebut this by
preponderating evidence, and the presumption of sanity
would have no probative force."4
It is difficult to see why it should be necessary to charge on
the burden of proof (used in the sense of the duty of going
forward) in the one case and not in the other. It would seem
that the rule stated in Wheeler's Appeal is correct and that the
implied statement to the contrary in Kirby's Appeal was unin-
tended.
As shown by Professor Thayer, much of the confusion in the
cases on this subject is probably due to the equivocal language
used. One of the terms suggested by him, however, seems
unhappily chosen. There is never a "duty" on the part of
anyone to go forward any more than there is a "duty" to bring
a law suit or to defend one. In either case a failure to act may
1 (917) :oo At. (Conn.) 13.
" (1916) 91 Conn. 4o; commented upon in (x916) 26 YALE. LAW
JouRNAL, 62.
' (1916) 91 Conn. 44.
(917) zoo Atl. (Conn.) i8.
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be followed by certain results, i. e., the court will make no
decree or will render a decree by default. So if a party against
whom a presumption is in force fails to go forward, he loses.
Keeping in mind the distinction between the risk of non-
persuasion and the necessity of going forward or losing, and
the fact that, as shown by Professor Wigmore, the rules as to
the necessity of going forward are laid down for the guidance
of the judge in either granting a motion for non-suit, direct-
ing a verdict, or setting aside a verdict, whereas the rules as to
the risk of non-persuasion are laid down for the guidance of
the jury in determining what verdict should be rendered upon
any issue in equipoise, it would seem correct to go farther than
is done in Wheeler's Appeal and to say that there is never any
reason why the court should charge the jury as to the rules upon
the subject of the necessity of going forward. These rules
apply when there is only one possible legal inference from the
evidence. Ordinarily this condition arises only when a presump-
tion exists in favor of one of the parties. Under the theory of
presumption, as elucidated by Professor Thayer, and as stated
by Professor Wigmore, as soon as other evidence is offered, this
rule no longer operates. It has become a matter of history,
and a matter of history information as to which cannot help
the jury.
On the other hand, care must be taken not to draw a wrong
conclusion from the statement made in Wheeler's Appeal, that
after the introduction of other evidente the presumption of
sanity would have no probative force. This statement itself is
true for the presumption is not evidence. It is merely a rule
of law that in the absence of evidence the fact of execution of
a paper requires the inference of sanity, while if other evidence
is introduced, no such inference is required. It is not true,
however, that the fact of execution which furnished the basis
for the rule of law no longer has probative force. It is still a
circumstance to be considered by the jury, from which proper
inference may be drawn.
A clearer illustration of this truth appears in a situation such
as exists in Kirby's Appeal. As all the facts which appear are
that the beneficiary of the gift under a will, not being an heir,
stood in a confidential relationship to the maker of the will, there
is an implication of undue influence which is sufficient to require
a verdict of undue influence unless other evidence is offered.
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If, however, other evidence is offered, it becomes a question for
the jury who, however, must continue to consider the fact of
the existence of the confidential relationship and to give that
fact its due weight in its deliberations, and the parties are entitled
to have the court explain to the jury the significance of these
facts. It would seem that a similar rule should apply to any
other set of operative facts that give rise to a presumption.
HARRISON HEWITT.
AN "EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE" TO PHOTOGRAPH AS "PROPERTY."
The recent English case of Sports and General Press Agency
v. "Our Dogs" Publishing Co.1 suggests a number of interesting
and important problems as to the exact nature and extent of the
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities possessed by an owner
of "property."
An action was brought for an injunction restraining the
defendant from publishing photographs taken at a dog show
and the court was called upon to decide whether an "exclusive
privilege" to take photographs existed in law as "property."
It appeared that the promoters of the show purported in good
faith to sell the sole photographic privileges at the show to A
who in turn purported to assign to the plaintiff. Although no
notice appeared on the tickets of admission or elsewhere on the
grounds, the court found that the defendant's agent, when he took
the photographs, and the defendant when he received them,
knew of the assignment of the sole privilege to the plaintiff. In
a brief opinibn Horridge, J., denied the existence of any such
"exclusive privilege" of photographing which the owners could
assign as "property."
The principles involved would appear to be closely related
if not identical with those which have been recognized and
sanctioned in the so-called "right of privacy" doctrine which
received positive recognition but a few years ago. Indeed, it
might be pointed out that the courts in recognizing this "right
of privacy" are merely extending or adding to the sum total or
aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities which
belong to the individual. In the principal case, it was sought
not to increase the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities
1 [x916] 2 K. B. 88o; aff'd (1917) 61 S. J. (Ct. of App.) _W9.
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enjoyed by an individual but rather those enjoyed by an owner
of personalty which it is more usual to designate as "property."2
It may be of value to analyze the situation presented in the prin-
cipal case and determine whether the common law, cast in the
rigid mould of an earlier economic period, affords the same
relative protection and security of person and property under
modern industrial and commercial conditions that it did in its
beginning.
With this view in mind, no regard will be paid to the possible
existence of such an "exclusive privilege" arising ipso facto out
of the possession of land or as A "personal right." While it
would seem that there are possible grounds for so asserting,
it is clear that its strongest claim for recognition is as a "personal
property right."
The existence before publication of a "property" interest in
the author over his compositions or letters even though of a
private character and of no values- in the individual over his
picture4 ; in the lecturer over his lecture5 ; in the artist over
his paintings; in the broker over his compilation of stock quota-
tions, 7 can no longer be questioned. In all of these cases the courts
'Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (x913)
23 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 16, 21, states: "A second reason for the tendency
to confuse or blend non-legal and legal conceptions consists in the
ambiguity and looseness of our legal terminology. The word 'property'
furnishes a striking example. Both with lawyers and with laymen thig
term has no definite or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to
indicate the physical object to which the various legal rights, privileges,
etc., relate; then again-with far-greater discrimination and accuracy-
the word is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of legal
relations) appertaining to such physical object. Frequently there is a
rapid and fallacious shift from the one meaning to the other. At times,
also, the term is used in such a 'blended' sense as to convey no definite
meaning whatever."
'Millar v. Taylor (769) 4 Burr. 2303; Macklin v. Richardson (1790)
Amb. 694; Folsam v. Marsh (1841) 2 Story (c. c.) ioo.
"Pavesich v. N. E. Life Ins. Co. (89o4) 122 Ga. igo; Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co. (igo7) 73 N. J. Eq. x36; Munden v. Harris (igir)
853 Mo. App. 652.
" Caird v. Sime (1887) L. R. 12 App. Cas. 326; cf. Abernethy v. Hutchin-
son (1825) 3 L. J. (Ch.) 209.
'Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 2 De G. & Sm. 652; Turner v.
Robinson (1859) io Ir. Ch. 12f.
"Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Central News [8897] 2 Ch. 48; Exchange
Telegraph Co. v. Gregory [x896] i Q. B. 147.
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have recognized a "property" interest in the owner. In other
words the owner possesses certain rights, privileges, powers and
immunities as regards the subject-matter of the "property"
while the rest of the world are under the corresponding no-rights,
duties, liabilities and disabilities."
If, in the principal case, the promoter of the show arranged the
dogs according to some artistic scheme there would seem to be
little difficulty in recognizing the creation of a "personal prop-
erty" interest, analogous to those already recognized in other
artistic and literary creations. If so, it would follow that the
owner would possess an aggregate of rights, privileges, powers
and immunities similar to those possessed by any owner of a
chattel; that when the defendant attempted to violate his duty
to the plaintiff by photographing the arrangement, an injunction
would be the proper remedy as in the above named cases. It is
assumed of course that once the existence of this aggregate of
rights, privileges, powers and immunities is established, they are
transferable at will: the power to alienate would seem to be a
natural attribute.
Indeed, it should be noted that when the term "exclusive
privilege" is employed what is meant is not only a privilege in
the possessor to photograph but also a right that others should
not ;- a power or ability to extinguish his own interest and create
a new and corresponding interest in another by a transfer as was
attempted in the principal case; and an immunity or freedom, as
regards the "privilege," from the legal power or control of the
assignor. Of course the above-named by no means constitute
the whole aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities
but merely indicate the wide scope of the concept "exclusive
privilege."
Assuming, however, that the defendant did not attempt to
take or publish the photograph of the arrangement as an entirety,
a more difficult problem is encountered. Yet even in this case
it would seem that a similar conclusion should be reached. The
court in determining that no "exclusive privilege" did exist
intimated that such a privilege could have been created by incor-
porating a prohibition in the contract of admission. This sugges-
tion raises the question as to the exact content of the privileges
secured by the purchasers of the tickets of admission.
'For the correct analysis of these conceptions, see Professor Hohfeld
(1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6.
1 781
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Unless the privilege to photograph was expressly granted in
the contract of admission those admitted would seem to have
acquired a mere privilege of viewing the show; not the privilege
of photographing it. And even though it be granted that the
privilege of photographing was to be implied from the contract
of admission it would not necessarily follow that another
privilege to publish was secured.
After the attempted transfer of the "exclusive privilege"
from the promoter to the plaintiff's assignor, did the promoter
retain any such privilege which he could grant to the purchasers
of tickets of admission? Previously to the transactions reported
in the case the "exclusive privilege" undoubtedly existed in
the promoter. The situation is not unlike the case of an artist
who has completed his painting but has not published it. The
purchaser of the "exclusive privilege" ought certainly to get
all the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities possessed by
the promoter, which indeed would leave the latter no privilege
of photographing to grant to the purchasers of tickets. On the
contrary, after the transfer of the "exclusive privilege" the
promoter would clearly be under a duty, a no-right, etc., as to it.
He had exercised his power to extinguish his interest and create
a similar interest in the plaintiff's assignor who likewise extin-
guished his interest and created a similar interest in the plaintiff.
After extinguishing his interest each occupied a position similar
to all the rest of the world in that they were under a duty, a no-
right, etc. Even though the tickets of admission purported to
give the holder a privilege to photograph, unless a doctrine of
bona fide purchase be invoked it must be held that he received no
such privilege. If the doctrine of bona fide purchaser be invoked,
it might be held that while the promoter retained no privilege he
did retain a power to grant a privilege. This would be analogous
to the situation in the law of negotiable instruments where a
thief with no title has the power to pass a good title to an
innocent purchaser. It is not believed, however, that the courts
would invoke this rule of the law of negotiable instruments.
But even admitting that in some mysterious way the ticket-
holder did secure a privilege to photograph, that privilege in
itself would not enable him to publish the photographs. Here
the court might well stop and say that while a privilege to photo-
graph existed, yet the photographer was under a duty not to
publish any photographs that might be taken.
The entire absence even for all time of a precedent for an
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asserted right, privilege, power, or immunity should not be
conclusive as to its non-existence. The development of our law
must so continue as to meet the changing conditions of social,
political, industrial and commercial life. It would be a severe
reproach upon our Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence if the
courts were powerless to avoid the pitfall of antiquarianism and
to extend the application of existing legal and equitable principles
to subserve the interests of society. When new questions arise
like those in the principal case the courts should break through
the iron rule of legal exegesis and consider the economic and
social ends to be attained.
S. F. D.
C. M.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF "EQUITABLE CONVERSION"
TO CASES OF OPTION CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASE OF
REAL ESTATE.
The ever recurring spectacle in our courts of devoted relatives
assembled for battle over the worldly goods of a much mourned
decedent lends interest to any decision which establishes a
definite rule of law as to the distribution of property under a
given state of facts. Especially is this true if the opinion of the
court represents a progressive step and is backed with convinc-
ing argument. On all of these grounds the recent Iowa case of
Ingraham v. Chandler' commends itself to our attention. It
involves the important and long standing question of whether
an option on real estate works an equitable conversion thereof,
the facts being briefly these: One Wykert leased real estate to
Dunn for five years with an option to purchase at a fixed price
during the term. Wykert died in a year. Dunn later exercised
his option, paid the agreed price to the executrix, and received
conveyance. The case came up on the question of who should
receive the money, the executrix having kept it as legatee. The
Iowa court answered the question in favor of the heirs, thereby
repudiating the rule established by a long line of English cases2
which have been followed by some American decisions.3
1 (1917) I6I N. W. (Ia.) 434.
"Lawes v. Bennett (i8o5) i Cox, 167; Townley v. Bedwell (i8o8) 14
Ves. 591; Collingwood v. Rowe (1857) 3 Jur. (x. s.) 785; In re Isaacs
(1894) 3 Ch. 5o6.
'Kerr v. Day (i85o) 14 Pa. St. 112; Newport W. Wks. v. Sisson
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In examining the case it may be well to consider it from both
a legal and a practical standpoint. The legal argument for a
conversion by a contract of option is that such a contract is as
binding on the owner of the realty as is a contract to convey,
in which case an immediate equitable conversion is regarded as
taking place.4 A comparison, however, of the legal status of the
parties under each of the above contracts will serve as a criticism
of the argument advanced. When A agrees to sell and B to
buy a piece of real estate, each is thereafter under a personal
duty to perform in accord with the terms of the agreement.
To this personal duty is added another factor; namely, the
willingness of equity to decree specific performance5 of the
agreement.6 The result is that A has not only a legal right to
damages if B does not buy, but a right in equity to convey and
compel payment. Correspondingly, B has his right to damages
and he has also a definite, specifically enforceable, claim on prop-
erty in the hands of A. For this latter reason the purchaser's
claim is sometimes spoken of as attaching to the particular piece
of land. Sometimes the transaction is considered as making
the vendor a trustee of the legal title to the land and the vendee
likewise trustee of the purchase money, each for the benefit of
the other.7
It is this state of facts which has been judicially called
equitable conversion, and perhaps the phrase finds some support
in the parlance of business, for who has not heard from a lay-
man- some such remark as this? "Hello, Smith, I've turned my
State street frontage into money at last. We close the deal next
(1893) i8 R. I. 411; McCutcheon's Estate (x15) 24 Pa. Dist. 94; see
Keep v. Miller (1886) 42 N. J. Eq. ioo, O7.
"Leiper's Appeal (i86o) 35 Pa. St. 42o; Keep v. Miller (886) 42
N. J. Eq. xoo; Williams v. Haddock (1895) 145 N. Y. I44; Clapp v.
Tower (I9O3) ii N. D. 556; Stewart v. Griffith (I9io) 217 U. S. 323,
affirming Griffith v. Stewart (i9o8) 31 App. (D. 4t.) 29; Rhodes v. Mere-
dith (913) 2o Ill., 138; Farrar z,. Winterton (1842) 5 Beav. .
'Often only specific reparation since the date of performance has passed.
'Enforcing conveyance, Herrman v. Babcock (1885) io3 Ind. 461;
enforcing payment, Hodges v. Kowing (i889) 58 Conn. 12.
Green v. Smith (1738) I Atk. 572, 573; Craig v. Leslie (818) 3 Wheat.
(U. S.) 563, 578; Kerr v. Day (i85o) 14 Pa. St. 112, 114; Lombard v.
Chi. Sinai Cong. (1872) 64 Ill. 477, 482; Dorsey v. Hall (1878) 7 Neb.
46o, 464. As to the second part, however, that the vendee is trustee of
the purchase money. tne statement would appear inaccurate unless he had
set aside in a bank, or elsewhere, a specific fund.
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week." The fact is that the phrase "equitable conversion" is
a fictitious way of describing the jural results which proceed
from such a transaction, and this fact should be recognized to
avoid confusion.
What is the real situation? A retains the legal title to his
land; he obtains a claim against B as noted above, this claim
being manifestly personalty.8 If A should die intestate at this
juncture, his heir would inherit the legal title to the real estate
and his administrator would come into possession of the claim
against B. The legal title would descend subject to the claim of
B, and the heir would have to convey gratis.9 Next follow the
same series with regard to B. He retains complete title to his
money, acquires a personal claim against A to have the deed
executed at the proper time, and in addition acquires a set of
equitable interests in the real estate contracted for, being there-
after a beneficiary thereof. Should B now die intestate, his
administrator takes the money and the common-law claim against
A for conveyance. The money he receives is, however, subject
to the claim of A for the purchase price.10 By this is meant not
that any particular part of the money is so subject but that the
estate of B is debtor to that amount. To the heir descends the
equitable interest in the real estate of A, it being as much realty
as a legal interest in the same land." Thus, in the case of a
contract, equitable conversion is found to be nothing but the
result of applying ordinary principles to the facts in hand.
Properly conceived, the phrase is harmless; it is brief and
perhaps serviceable.
But how is it in the case of an option? Recurring momentarily
to the layman's point of view, it would be difficult to imagine a
business man making the remark suggested above if all he had
done was to give an option on his vacant lot; and investigation
may prove the difference legally to be both as real and as patent
as it is in the common place illustration.
Two classes of options may be mentioned. The first of these
"This would be even clearer in the case of notes being given by B to A,
the notes being unquestionably part of A's personal estate. Cf. Fuller
v. Bradley (i896) i6o IlL. 5z.
kBubb's Case (x678) Freem. Ch. 39.
" Milner v. Mills (1729) Mos. 123; Young v. Young (x889) 45 N. J. Eq.
27,34.
'Avery's Lessee v. Defrees (1839) 9 Oh. St. 145, 147; Ratcliff v.
Ratcliff (x9o4) io2 Va. 88o, 884.
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amounts to a unilateral conditional contract to buy and sell.12
For ten dollars now received, A agrees to sell certain real estate
to B for $z,ooo, if paid on or before six months. Under these
circumstances, A retains his legal title less certain of the usual
incidents thereof, important among which is the privilege of
conveying free from the obligation to B. He has not, however,
as distinguished from the case of an unconditional contract with
B, any claim whatever against the latter and never can have.
If he die intestate, nothing, therefore, should logically pass to
the personal representative,13 while the heir should take the
legal title to the realty subject to the same embarrassmentsw 4
which it possessed in the hands of A himself. The principal
case appears to be one of the kind just described and if the
reasoning above be sound, it will sustain the decision of the
Iowa court.
Let us consider now the other side of the transaction, the posi-
tion of B. Whatever the interest15 which he acquired by the
option may be, it attaches to the particular piece of land and is
consequently realty which should pass to his heir.18 A careful
scrutiny of this interest will reveal it as a power1 7 to acquire
" See Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Option Contracts (1914) 23 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 650.
' Note the border line. If the condition is the happening of some event
beyond the power of either party to control, the case ceases to be one
of option and something exists to pass to the personal representative.
Claims against B if it rain on Christmas Day are something, even
though of little value. Those against B if he chose to tolerate them are
legally nothing at all.
" Land subject to a power is not thereby prevented from being inherited
by heirs. Gill v. Grand Tower M. Mfg. & Trans. Co. (1879) 92 Ill. 249.
The following contain dicta to the effect that no interest is acquired.
Meyers v. Stone & Son (i9o5) 128 Ia. io, 12; Gustin v. Union School
Dist. (893) 94 Mich. "502, 504, citing Richardson v. Hardwick (1882)
io6 U. S. 252.
'In re Adams and the Kensington Vestry (1883) 24 Ch. Div. 199;
Gustin v. Un. School Dist., supra, contra, however.
'In re Walker's Estate (1853) 17 Jur. 706. This was the case of an
option given to a railway company which already had by act of Parlia-
ment the right of eminent domain. The vice-chancellor speaks of the
power from Parliament to take the lands, but does not apply the word
to the right derived from the landowner by virtue of the option. It is
interesting to note that the two powers are fundamentally the same, the
law creating the one without the consent of the landowner, and the
other, so to speak, at his request, or as more generally understood, he
created it.
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title upon payment of the agreed price. The heir who holds this
power has the accompanying equitable claim against A that the
latter shall not sell the land to a bona fide purchaser in whose
hands it would be freed from the power.
Allusion has been made to options of a second type. These
are continuing offers 8 to make a bilateral contract and not sub-ject to revocationOt9 One who has given such an option is in
much the same position over a long period as is an offeror of a
bilateral contract by mail for a very brief time. In neither case
is he bound to do anything. In both cases he may become so at
any time. In the first he cannot revoke; in the second his
attempted revocation may prove ineffective because of the law
relative to mailing an acceptance. This. second class of option
contracts contemplate mutual obligations after the exercise of
the option, that is, the acceptance of the offer. Instead of one
payment and an immediate conveyance, as in the first class con-
sidered, there may be a series of payments with various deeds,
mortgages and notes executed at stipulated dates before the
consummation of the contract. Whereas the vendor A, in the
first class of options, never had a claim against B, in this latter
class he has such claims from the moment of the exercise of the
option. Before that date he had a chance, dependent entirely
upon the wish of B, to acquire such claims. The argument for
equitable conversion here depends on the passing of this chance
to the personal representative. It is submitted that such an
argument is not tenable, and that the option when exercised by
B should result in transactions entirely with the heir who took
the land of his ancestor subject to this very liability.
Some brief word may be added as to practical reasons for the
distinction urged above. On these grounds the original case of
Lawes v. Bennett has been freely criticised by the long line
of cases following it in England.
Having in mind the wishes of the testator, it is clear that no
third party should be permitted by law to have the power of
settling by his act the distribution of the testator's estate. This
objection is especially cogent when it is observed that an oppor-
tunity is also granted to bid the heir against the personal
representative on a threat of exercising, or not exercising, the
'Milw. Mech. Ins. Co. v. Rhea (9o3) r23 Fed. 9, Ii.
" See Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (I917) 26
YALE LAW JOURNA, x6g, 185.
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option. It is a startling and dangerous rule of law which will
permit a third party to say to the heir, "Deed me half for nothing
or you lose it all." This point seems first to have been advanced
by counsel in the case 20 which acted as pioneer in breaking away
from the old rule, although the court there does not appear to
have based its decision in any degree on the argument.
Another objection to the rule of Lawes v. Bennett has been
raised in England.21 The decisions grant rents and profits to
the heir until'the option is exercised. Under the Iowa rule,
when the heir gave up the land, he would receive the purchase
price. Under the English rule, the heir would suddenly lose all
even although he had been many years in possession.
The Iowa court offers a noteworthy excuse for the acceptance
in England of the doctrine which it repudiates here, and one
which seems not to have been advanced by the English courts
themselves; namely, that in view of the favoritism shown by
English law for the eldest son, any rule which breaks the chain
of straight descent of realty tends to a wider distribution of the
English soil.
For one reason or another the decision of the Iowa court is
in line With what promises to be the modem American view of
the matter,22 despite a present conflict of authority.
M. S. B.
Smith v. Lowenstein (x893) 50 Oh. St 346.
Townley v. Bedwelil (x8o8) 14 Ves. 591, 596.
'Smith v. Lowenstein, supra; Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary
(xg1) 203 N. Y. 469, accord.
